yep, since it’s under a “copyleft” (communist) software license that’s how it has to be.
cultural reviewer and dabbler in stylistic premonitions
yep, since it’s under a “copyleft” (communist) software license that’s how it has to be.
Ads?! in Ubuntu? Never! They were simply “integrating online scope results into the home lens of the dash” 🤡
(that is an actual quote from the sentence immediately following “We’re not putting ads in Ubuntu” in Mark Shuttleworth’s blog post responding to the entirely predictable backlash after they did this, twelve years ago…)
What a confused image.
Redhat, however, found this solution too simple and instead devised their own scheme for assigning network interface names. It fails at solving the problem it was created to solve
I somehow first read “Redhat” as “Reddit” in this sentence, and so was briefly thinking that perhaps this bad idea originated there 😂
(probably the most downvoted post i’ve made yet on lemmy 😂)
Mattermost isn’t e2ee, but if the server is run by someone competent and they’re allowed to see everything anyway (eg it’s all group chat, and they’re in all the groups) then e2ee isn’t as important as it would be otherwise as it is only protecting against the server being compromised (a scenario which, if you’re using web-based solutions which do have e2ee, also leads to circumvention of it).
If you’re OK with not having e2ee, I would recommend Zulip over Mattermost. Mattermost is nice too though.
edit: oops, i see you also want DMs… Mattermost and Zulip both have them, but without e2ee. 😢
I could write a book about problems with Matrix, but if you want something relatively easy and full featured with (optional, and non-forward-secret) e2ee then it is probably your best bet today.
That installs and or updates roots flatpaks
Which is what flatpak will always do unless provided with the
--user
flag.
By default it operates in system-wide mode, which is different from “root’s”.
flatpak list
and sudo flatpak list
will both show you what is installed system wide, and flatpak list --user
will show you your user’s, and sudo flatpak list --user
will show you the root user’s flatpaks installed in per-user mode (of which there are typically none).
Only with --user
(I think)? Root can also update the “system installation” flatpaks, which are presumably what OP needed a password for.
next time you can use su
or sudo
Ente doesn’t seem to require a CLA.
It turns out, they do have a CLA (with full copyright assignment 😢).
They’d need to implement something like SRP.
Update: I contacted the developers to bring my comment to their attention and it turns out they have already implemented SRP to address this problem (but they haven’t updated their architecture document about it yet).
It is, but in this case I think it isn’t actually a weakness for the reasons I explained.
That’s complicated to do correctly. Normally, for the server to verify the user has the correct password, it needs to know or receive the password, at which point it could decrypt all the user’s files. They’d need to implement something like SRP.
What I proposed is that the server does not know the password (of course), but that it knows a thing derived from it (lets call it the loginSecret
) which the client can send to obtain the encryptedMasterKey
. This can be derived in a similar fashion to the keyEncryptionKey
(eg, they could be different outputs of an HKDF). The downside to the server knowing something derived from the passphrase is that it enables the server to do an offline brute force of it, but in any system like this where the server is storing something encrypted using [something derived from] the passphrase the server already has that ability.
Is there any downside to what I suggested, vs the current design?
And is there some reason I’m missing which would justify adding the complexity of SRP, vs what I proposed above?
The only reason I can think of would be to protect against a scenario where an attacker has somehow obtained the user’s loginSecret
from the server but has not obtained their encryptedMasterKey
: in that case they could use it to request the encryptedMasterKey
, and then could make offline guesses at the passphrase using that. But, they could also just use the loginSecret
for their offline brute-force. And, using SRP, the server still must also store something the user has derived from the password (which is equivalent to the loginSecret
in my simpler scheme) and obtaining that thing still gives the adversary an offline brute-force opportunity. So, I don’t think SRP provides any benefit here.
edit: the two issues i raised in this comment had both already been addressed.
this was the developer’s reply on matrix:
- We do have a CLA: https://cla-assistant.io/ente-io/ente
- We will update the iOS app to offer you an option to point to your self hosted instance (so that you can save yourself the trouble of building it): https://github.com/ente-io/ente/discussions/504
- The portion of the document that deals with authentication has been outdated, my bad. We’ve adopted SRP to fix the concerns that were pointed out: https://ente.io/blog/ente-adopts-secure-remote-passwords/
AGPL-3.0
Nice
This would be nice, but, this repo includes an iOS app, and AGPL3 binaries cannot be distributed via Apple’s App Store!
AGPL3 (without a special exception for Apple, like NextCloud’s iOS app has) is incompatible with iOS due to the four paragraphs of the license which mention “Installation Information” (known as the anti-tivoization clause).
Only the copyright holder(s) are able to grant Apple permission to distribute binaries of AGPL3-licensed software to iOS users under non-AGPL3 terms.
Every seemingly-(A)GPL3 app on Apple’s App Store has either copyright assignment so that a single entity has the sole right to distribute binaries in the App Store (eg, Signal messenger) or uses a modified license to carve out an Apple-specific exception to the anti-tivoization clause (eg, NextCloud). In my opinion, the first approach is faux free software, because anyone forking the software is not allowed to distribute it via the channel where the vast majority of users get their apps. (In either case, users aren’t allowed to run their own modified versions themselves without agreeing to additional terms from Apple, which is part of what the anti-tivoization clause is meant to prevent.)
Only really nice when not CLA is required and every contributor retains their copyright. Ente doesn’t seem to require a CLA.
I definitely agree here! But if it’s true that they’re accepting contributions without a CLA, and they haven’t added any iOS exception to their AGPL3 license, then they themselves would not be allowed to ship their own iOS app with 3rd party contributions to it! 😱 edit: it’s possible this is the case and Apple just hasn’t noticed yet, but that is not a sustainable situation if so.
If anyone reading this uses this software, especially on iOS, I highly recommend that you send the developers a link to this comment and encourage them to (after getting the consent of all copyright holders) add something akin to NextCloud’s COPYING.iOS to their repository ASAP.
cc @ioslife@lemmy.ml @baduhai@sopuli.xyz @skariko@feddit.it
(i’m not a lawyer, this is not legal advice, lol)
edit: in case a dev actually sees this… skimming your architecture document it looks like when a user’s email is compromised (“after you successfully verify your email”), the attacker is given the encryptedMasterKey
(encrypted with keyEncryptionKey
, which is derived from a passphrase) which lets them perform an offline brute-force attack on the passphrase. Wouldn’t it make more sense to require the user to demonstrate knowledge of their passphrase to the server prior to giving them the encryptedMasterKey
? For instance, when deriving keyEncryptionKey
, you could also derive another value which is stored on the server and which the client must present prior to receiving their encryptedMasterKey
. The server has the opportunity to do offline attacks on the passphrase either way, so it seems like there wouldn’t be a downside to this change. tldr: you shouldn’t let adversaries who have compromised a user’s email account have the ability to attack the passphrase offline.
(i’m not a cryptographer, but this is cryptography advice)
shoutout to @jaromil@fed.dyne.org who (i believe?) created this fork bomb :)
there is a great in-depth writeup about fork bombs in general, and this one specifically, here.
There is a version of VLC for the Nvidia Shield, but it has a somewhat irritating UI and I don’t know if it can actually read the menus like the desktop version can.
I’ll assume you’re genuinely unaware
I’m perfectly aware of what Ubuntu Pro is, and the difference between Ubuntu main
and universe
.
The current meme implies that Ubuntu/Canonical have actively disabled safety/security features in the form of withholding security updates, unless you pay for Ubuntu Pro subscription. The Ubuntu package support hasn’t changed with the introduction of Ubuntu Pro. The packages that were supported by Canonical prior to this are supported the same way today. The packages that were community supported prior to this are supported the same way today. Without Ununtu Pro.
If you think the meme implies that, then surely you must think that the message printed by Ubuntu’s apt upgrade
command in the screenshot implies that too, right?
One of the packages listed in this screenshot is libavcodec
, which is required by things like VLC (which is in Ubuntu universe
, which is enabled by default).
If you think it is perfectly fine for Canonical to do the work to patch that library and then withhold the security update from the vast majority of Ubuntu users who won’t sign up for Ubuntu Pro… we’ll have to agree to disagree.
huh? what is the misinformation here?
Okay tbf this is meant for companies that need to meet specific requirements like government privacy regulations, which change every year and need to be actively maintained or else you get in legal trouble.
Yeah you pretty much would only ever need to install these updates to libavcodec
and imagemagick
for regulatory compliance reasons, or maybe if you wanted to be able to safely load video or image files found on the internet without being subject to compromise by widely-available exploits for vulnerabilities that were published and fixed upstream last year.
i don’t actually think copyleft is communist per se, but i dig that you’re somehow mad about my joke - the intended butt of which was people who (typically disparagingly) insist that it is 😂